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In 2008, the then Archbishop of Canterbury, Rowan Williams, gave 
a speech in which he argued that to maintain support for legal 
authority in the UK, English law should allow for parallel systems 
of courts drawing from other sources of law, namely religious law. 
Dr Williams was speaking specifically of Muslim courts, Sharia 
courts, and he was postulating that it may be positive for the Eng-
lish law and for English justice in general, to facilitate for a more 
pluralist legal system in which people can choose which law they 
wish to comply with, religious or English1. Dr Williams’ speech re-
ceived a great deal of criticism, mostly unjustified, and this paper 
is seeking to use Dr Williams’ suggestions as a basis from which 
to critique whether a pluralist court system is possible, or in fact 
desirable, in the area of family law. By considering predominately 
Sharia Councils (courts) but also making some reference to the Jew-
ish equivalent, the Beth Din, the theoretical workings of a parallel 
religious tribunal with be explored and it shall be demonstrate that 
in reality, such a parallel system is unable to formally function. 
1 R. Williams, Civil and Religious Law in England: A Religious Perspective, 
“Ecclesiastical Journal” 2008, vol. p. 3, http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0956 
618X08001403.
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By considering evidence of the practical behaviour and func-
tioning of Sharia courts, it is apparent that such Councils are 
wildly over-stepping their jurisdiction within family matters and 
are heavily straying into criminal issues such as domestic abuse. 
Moreover, with the coming criminalisation of forced marriages, 
this jurisdictional spill-over is certain to increase exponentially. It 
shall not be concluded that Sharia and Jewish courts should cease 
to function in other areas of English law as in many areas such 
as commercial law they function very well and play an important 
role in a rightly expanding multicultural Britain. However, what 
shall be proposed is a far more heavily regulated religious family 
tribunal which no longer undermines and threatens the criminal 
jurisdiction of English courts.
Cultural identity is rapidly shifting in the face of ever grow-
ing globalisation. Identity is moving away from a pre-occupation 
with the nation, and toward a more nuanced and multifaceted 
understanding of the individual, including religious and cultural 
considerations. In the face of distrust and growing racial/religious 
suspicion, a new multiculturalism has emerged, one in which in-
dividuals are increasingly anxious to assert their own cultures 
and increasingly, their own laws2. A result of this is that the law 
in many countries is not being universally accepted as being the 
authority by which people resolve issues. Whilst ostensibly obey-
ing the law of the land, minority groups are increasingly turning 
to unofficial or alternative methods of dispute resolution which is 
leading to the practical fragmentation of the law3. Subsequently, 
our foundation of legal positivism and belief that the law stems
2 J. Brechen, A study of the use of Sharia law in religious arbitration in 
the United Kingdom and the concerns that this raises for human rights, “Ec-
clesiastical Law Journal” 2013, vol. 15, p. 1; http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/
S0956618X13000434.
3 A. Buchler, Islamic Family Law in Europe? From Dichotomies to Dis-
course: Or, Beyond Cultural or Religious Identity in Family Law, “International 
Journal of Law in Context” 2012, vol. 8, p. 6, http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/
S1744552312000043.
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from the State is being undermined4. This is particularly true in 
the UK in the area of family law. 
There are approximately 2,869,000 Muslims and just over 
260,000 Jews in the UK, not to mention the many other people 
of faiths other than the Church of England. The United Kingdom 
prides itself on tolerance and the allowing of other faiths to co-exist 
alongside the state religion. This is not the forum to discuss the 
quality of British tolerance but it is perhaps illustrative to refer to 
the infamous quote of the then Prime Minister, Tony Blair when 
he said: “Our tolerance is part of what makes Britain, Britain. 
So conform to it; or don’t come here… The right to be different. 
The Duty to integrate. (my emphasis) This is what being British 
means. And neither racists nor extremists should be allowed to 
destroy it”5.
This quote is significant as it demonstrates an on-going tension 
between the appearance of tolerance of other religions and the 
maintenance of values deemed to be British. Putting critical analy-
sis of what is cultural tolerance aside, there has been a tradition 
within the UK, as far as possible, to allow people of other faiths to 
practise their religion and maintain their culture when in the UK. 
Historically this has been expressed by the English recognition of 
the marriages of people within the British Empire, even when they 
were conducted through local custom and not English law6. In the 
last two hundred years this “tolerance” has also been demonstrated 
by the English legal system allowing Jewish courts to function 
alongside the English courts in matters such as family law matters 
and the controlling of kosher foods7. More recently this approach 
has been extended to Muslims and Sharia Councils through the 
establishment of the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal in 2007. 
4 Ibidem.
5 Quoted in A. Vakulenko, Liberalism, civilisation and the (non)oxymoronic 
limits of tolerance, “International Journal of Law in Context” 2007, vol. 11, 
p. 1, http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1744552307004065.
6 A. Buchler, op.cit., p. 6.
7 B. Berkovits, Beth Din arbitration and the Human Rights Act, section 6, 
“Arbitration” 2005, vol. 71, p. 1.
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It is far beyond the scope of this analysis to consider Sharia law 
in any detail, however, for contextual reasons it is important to rec-
ognise that Sharia law is in fact not one set of laws per se. Muslim 
law draws from two main sources of authority, the Quran and the 
Sunnah but, as all sources of law, there is some discussion about 
the interpretation of these texts8. It is sufficient for our purposes 
to acknowledge that Sharia law considers the majority of family 
law matters to be private and subject to religious law, not the law 
of the land within which a Muslim may be residing.
1. The rationale behind a pluralist system
It is wrong to assume that all Muslims in the UK wish to live under 
Sharia law and moreover, it is wrong to think of Muslims in the UK 
as being homogenous. But clearly a number of the nearly 3 million 
Muslims in Britain today wish to maintain their cultural heritage 
by conducting some law under Sharia authority9. Moreover, it has 
been well argued that: “obedience to law is not forthcoming simply 
because it is the command of a Sovereign. Law must serve some 
genuine or perceived needs of the people before it can gain legiti-
macy, otherwise it is just a command of some powerful entity: to 
be submitted to but not to be accepted as legitimate”10.
In light of the fact that Islamic politics and law does not rec-
ognise the distinction between religious and secular spheres of 
life, if the English court system wishes those Muslims wanting to 
live under Sharia to integrate into the English legal system, they 
have to accommodate for some cultural and legal practices which 
vary from the English. Undoubtedly the use of ADR in the UK has 
8 A. Kamali, The Influence of Sharia Norms on Dispute Settlement and In-
ternational Law: the International Court of Justice, Room for Accommodation?, 
Westlaw 2009, p. 4.
9 S. Bano, Inpursuit of religious and legal diversity: a response to the Arch-
bishop of Canterbury and the “Sharia debate” in Britain, “Ecclesiastical Law 
Journal” 2008, vol. 10, p. 2.
10 A. Ishtiaq, Western and Muslim perceptions of universal human rights, 
“Afrika Focus” 1994, vol. 10, p. 31.
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been popular as it empowers parties involved in the dispute and 
reduces the burden of courts11. However, in our haste to move 
law into the private sphere we have risked privatising and thus, 
hiding, areas of law which ought to remain public12, specifically 
domestic violence.
2. Sharia Councils and The Muslim  
Arbitration Tribunal
The Muslim Arbitration Tribunal(MAT) came into being following 
calls for regulation of Sharia Councils which had been in operation 
in the UK unofficially since the 1970s13. Prior to the Arbitration 
Act 1996 which provided the legal foundation upon which many 
Sharia Councils began to operate formally, these councils would 
be involved in marital disputes from divorce to child care. However, 
these decisions had no impact on English legal judgments. The es-
tablishment of formal Sharia Councils allowed people to choose any 
third party to act as arbitrator on their behalf14 and these decisions 
would carry some weight within the English court system.
These councils were further formalised by the Muslim Arbitra-
tion Tribunal. Established in 2007, the MAT is supposed to operate 
within a civil jurisdiction, focusing mainly on divorces and com-
mercial disputes and the decisions of which are treated as any other 
alternate dispute resolution tribunal. This means that parties can 
consent to have their disputes decided by a third party and that 
these decisions are recognised in an English court. This is not to 
say that such decisions cannot be appealed in an English court 
but English courts will generally have respect for the fact that the 
parties have agreed to a particular party deciding an issue and 
are reluctant to change these decisions on the grounds that one 
11 J.Brechen, op.cit., p. 3.
12 S. Bano, op.cit., p. 6.
13 M. Enright, Preferring the stranger? Towards an Irish approach to Muslim 
divorce practice, “Irish Jurist” 2013, vol. 49, p. 2.
14 Z. Akhar, Conflict of laws, Sharia and dispute resolution, “International 
Arbitration Law Review” 2011, p. 1.
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party is unhappy with the outcome. The MAT rules of procedure 
state that the tribunal’s role is to provide “a viable alternative for 
the Muslim community seeking to resolve disputes in accordance 
with Islamic Sacred Law and without having to resort to costly and 
time consuming litigation”15.
Sharia courts essentially play three functions: to mediate and 
provide advice on family matters, to issue divorces to women (Mus-
lim men do not need permission to get a divorce as they can unilat-
erally divorce their wives), and to provide expert opinion to English 
courts on matters of Sharia law16.
The MAT is more regulated than local Sharia Councils which 
often sit in people’s houses and in mosques. An MAT tribunal will be 
made up of at least one Sharia law scholar and one lawyer qualified 
in English law and whilst the decisions are to be made with close 
consideration of Muslim law, the English lawyer is supposed to en-
sure that no English laws are undermined. It is significant to note 
that the MAT does purport to address issues of domestic violence 
and forced marriage but only the civil remit of these areas17. 
3. Sharia and the criminal law
It is the area of family law which upsets the hopes for a plural-
ist legal system. It is here that we most clearly find the overlap 
between family and criminal law. Domestic abuse has, until fairly 
recently, often been seen as a matter of private rather than public 
law within the English system and this delineation between public 
and private family matters has been maintained by Muslim law to 
a large extent. However it should be noted that extreme violence is 
deemed inappropriate for arbitration within Muslim law18.
English law recognises that there are public and private dimen-
sions to family law but it is within this area of law that we see the 
15 Ibidem.
16 S. Bano, op.cit., p. 7.
17 Z. Akhar, op.cit., p. 1.
18 A. Kamali, op.cit., p. 1.
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most tension between religion, culture and tradition19. For example 
in English law, there is a clear distinction between private child law, 
when the parents dispute child care or contact, and public child 
care, when the state intervenes for the protection or well-being of 
the child. This is also the case for marital-related issues in which 
divorce and ancillary relief are private matters whereas abusive 
and threatening behaviour between spouses is deemed criminal 
and therefore a public matter. Sharia law does not separate these 
issues into the private and public and Sharia law has a great deal 
of canon in all issues relating to the family20.
4. English law and domestic abuse
This is not the forum to dissect and compare all areas of intersection 
between family and criminal law but there are main examples of 
English and Sharia approaches to criminal law coming into direct 
conflict: non-molestation orders and forced marriage.
Non-molestation orders were introduced in 1996 and were de-
signed to act as civil injunctions against abusive partners and ex-
partners21 often stipulating conditions such as the abusive party 
having to remain a certain distance away from the victim. Whilst 
these were civil injunctions, the breaching of them, like any civil 
court order, could result in criminal prosecution for contempt of 
court. This could result in anything up to a two year custodial 
sentence. These orders were made more stringent in 2004 when 
a breach of a non-molestation order was deemed to be a new 
criminal offence punishable by 5 years in prison. This new offence 
allowed victims to decide whether to rely on the civil procedure or 
to contact the police and have the matter publically prosecuted. 
The purpose of these orders is to prevent abusive partners from 
further abusive behaviour, often at a time of divorce or of child 
custody proceedings. In the UK domestic violence is prosecuted in 
19 A. Buchler, op.cit., p. 1.
20 Ibidem.
21 S.42(2) and S.45(1) Family Law Act 1996.
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a slightly different way to non-domestic assaults in that prosecu-
tors are aware of victims’ tendency to with draw complaints to the 
police either because of further threats from their partners or be-
cause of psychiatric conditions such as Battered Person Syndrome. 
Subsequently, prosecutors will continue with prosecutions even 
where the victim retracts their complaint, relying on evidence of 
medical reports and expert witnesses who will testify to the effect 
of long term abuse on the mental state of victims. These proceed-
ings can be on-going at the same time as divorce proceedings and 
subsequently, this is the clearest example of when private meets 
public law.
5. Sharia councils  
and domestic abuse
How do Sharia Councils undermine these orders and the approach 
of prosecuting domestic abuse? As previously suggested, Sharia 
law does not make the same distinction between private and public 
family law as exists in the UK. Muslim (and Jewish) cultures largely 
define any issue relating to marriage as private22 and subsequently, 
come to the conclusion that such matters may be open to arbitra-
tion rather than any public law involvement.
The first concern raised by the use of private arbitration in 
the field of domestic violence is that it undermines the role of the 
state to prosecute offences which we, as a society, find particularly 
abhorrent. In its simplest terms, the criminal law defines those 
acts which society believes ought to be punished with the loss of 
liberty but also, with the public shaming of the defendant. Sharia 
Councils or a Beth Din cannot achieve this as they do not have 
the power to forcibly detain offenders and their arbitration, by 
definition, is private. 
22 A. Madera, Juridical bonds of marriage for Jewish and Islamic women, 
“Ecclesiastical Law Journal” 2009, vol. 11, p. 1, http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/
S0956618X0900163X.
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The second concern with using Sharia Councils for domestic 
violence is that, even if we do forsake the remedy of prison for
domestic violence, there is a presumption in arbitration that both 
parties are consenting to the use of an arbitrator as opposed to 
seeking a remedy through the English courts23. Currently there 
are no safeguards to ensure that parties are freely co-operating 
with the Sharia Council or a Beth Din. Both Judaism and Islam 
calls for arbitration in this field either through the mechanism of 
a Siruv, compelling Jewsto submit to the Beth Din24, or through 
the teaching of the Quran, which relies heavily upon religious ar-
bitration in this field.
There are very strong arguments to suggest that many women 
who seek relief under the law due to domestic violence are put under 
pressure, both religious and from their communities, to conform to 
religious rather than English law25. However, social and emotional 
pressure is not recognised as legal coercion in English law and 
subsequently, Sharia Councils could argue that it is perfectly legal 
to pressurize women into accepting the jurisdiction of Sharia. 
In the arbitration process itself, there are many accounts of 
women being made to accept that they are to blame for deserting 
their husbands even if they have been “chastised” by them26. This 
often leads to women feeling as though they are obliged to return to 
a violent relationship which puts them in danger. This is in direct 
conflict with the English criminal law in instances when a non-
molestation order has been granted. A woman may be granted an 
injunction against an abusive husband in an English court but 
the Sharia Council will tell her that she has a duty to sit with her 
husband and discuss whether they can be reconciled27. This often 
puts women into direct physical danger28. Moreover, the procedure 
rules of the MAT give worryingly little regard for the physical safety 
of women during arbitration and refer only fleetingly about not al-
23 A. Buchler, op.cit., p. 10.
24 B. Berkovits, op.cit., p. 2.
25 S. Bano, op.cit., p. 5.
26 Ibidem, p. 10.
27 Ibidem, p. 9.
28 Ibidem, p. 10
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lowing direct arbitration where a party is behaving in a “violent or 
disorderly manner”29.
A third concern with the use of Sharia arbitration in the field of 
domestic abuse is that whilst Islamic law does allow for the dissolu-
tion of marriage (which is the remedy women are mostly seeking), 
this is only acceptable when ill-treatment between spouses makes 
conjugal life intolerable30. This is a high threshold to meet and 
individual accounts of experiences with Sharia Councils suggest 
that some arbitrators appear to take the view that reconciliation is 
more important than protecting women31. Sharia councils consider 
their first duty to be to try and save marriages rather than to grant 
relief to women escaping violent husbands through the medium 
of divorce. Perhaps more significantly, most Sharia scholars are 
agreed that an element of physical chastisement of women is per-
fectly acceptable in marriage and only problematic if the woman 
is seriously hurt32. This is in direct conflict with English criminal 
law which states that victims cannot even consent to more serious 
assaults unless there is a reason such as surgery33. Subsequently, 
even if Muslims choose to live by a code which sees them beaten 
by their husbands, the English law does not permit this.
6. Conclusion
A possible safeguard for victims of domestic violence in the face of 
Sharia as the Beth Din jurisdiction is the requirement of independ-
ent legal advice for both parties before acquiescing to Sharia as the 
Beth Din. Ostensibly this may appear an attractive solution but in 
the face of family, community and religious pressure it is unlikely 
that an English lawyer is going to have any impact in convincing
some Muslim women that they have an alternative option and do 
not have to be subject to Sharia.
29 S.5 (1) (3) Procedure Rules for the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal.
30 A. Madera, op.cit, p. 5.
31 S. Bano,op.cit., p. 9.
32 J. Brechen, op.cit., p. 8.
33 R v Brown [1994]1 AC 212.
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Legally and practically it is impossible for there to exist an en-
tirely pluralistic system of courts and tribunals in the UK in the 
realm of family law. This is due to the overlapping issues which 
stray into the criminal law, the adjudication of which must remain 
within English law. This does not mean that alternative dispute 
resolution and parallel tribunals such as the Beth Din and Shar’ia 
courts cannot exist at all, but if they are to be a viable and fair form 
of arbitration, there must be a clear delineation between private 
and public areas of law such as marital breakdown and domestic 
violence. Moreover, this system must be regulated and enforced by 
national legal mechanisms and not left to the discretion of local 
religious leaders.
Before the establishment of the MAT, Sharia Councils were 
happy to function in a private and unregulated domain and whilst 
this may be for a number of reasons, the result is that issues of 
domestic violence were being hidden and not addressed according 
to English law. With regard to forced marriage, the British govern-
ment has recognised that this is a further area of family law which 
has previously been considered in the civil sphere, and thus the 
private sphere, but which must be criminalised if it is to be publi-
cally enforced.
This paper has not attempted to lay down rules of regulation 
which may protect women from the hiding and, in some cases, the 
condoning of domestic violence. Rather, it has sought to highlight 
the fundamental and perhaps unavoidable blockade in the path 
of a pluralist tribunal system in the UK.
STRESZCZENIE
Sądy szariackie i rabiniczne w Zjednoczonym Królestwie:  
czy pluralizm prawny jest tylko fikcją konieczną  
ze względów politycznych?
Około 2008 r. prezentowano postulaty wprowadzenia sądów religijnych jako 
użytecznego narzędzia wspomagającego angielski system wymiaru sprawie-
dliwości. Już w 2007 r. powołano Muzułmański Trybunał Arbitrażowy do
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rozstrzygania spraw cywilnych. Funkcjonuje on w oparciu o powszechną 
możliwość odwołania się stron do osoby trzeciej, której rozstrzygnięcie jest 
uznawane przez sądy. Jednakże podnosi się zarzut, że decydowanie w ten 
sposób w sprawach przemocy domowej podważa rolę oskarżyciela publicz-
nego w przypadkach uznawanych za szczególnie odrażające. Jednym z po-
stulowanych rozwiązań jest zapewnienie niezależnej pomocy prawnej obu 
stronom występującym przed sądami szariackimi bądź rabinicznymi.
Słowa kluczowe: sądy szariackie, sądy rabiniczne, przemoc domowa.
SUMMARY
Sharia and Beth Din courts in the UK: is legal pluralism nothing 
more than a necessary political fiction?
Since 2008, sharia courts were postulated that they may be positive for 
the English law and for English justice in general, to facilitate for a more 
pluralist legal system in which people can choose which law they wish to 
comply with, religious or English one. This idea was recognized as very 
controversial. Anyway the Muslim Arbitration Tribunal, supposed to operate 
within a civil jurisdiction, was established already in 2007. MAT is treated 
as any other alternate dispute resolution tribunal, what means that parties 
can consent to have their disputes decided by a third party and that these 
decisions are recognized in an English court. It is very important that abuse 
has, until fairly recently, often been seen as a matter of private rather than 
public law within the English system and this delineation between public 
and private family matters has been maintained by Muslim law to a large 
extent. The concern raised by the use of private arbitration in the field of 
domestic violence is that it undermines the role of the state to prosecute 
offences which a society find particularly abhorrent. A possible safeguard 
for victims of domestic violence in the face of Sharia or Jewish the Beth 
Din jurisdiction is the requirement of independent legal advice for both 
parties before acquiescing to Sharia as the Beth Din.
Keywords: Sharia courts Beth Din courts, domestic violence.
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